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THE SUBSTITUTION OF WORDS FOR
ANALYSIS AND OTHER JUDICIAL
PITFALLS: WHY DAVID SATTAZAHN
SHOULD HAVE RECEIVED DOUBLE
JEOPARDY PROTECTION
Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101 (2003)
I. INTRODUCTION
In Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, the Supreme Court held that double
jeopardy protection does not extend to a life sentence which is the product
of a hung jury at the capital sentencing proceedings.' David Sattazahn was
convicted of first-degree murder, but during the capital sentencing phase,
the trial court determined the jury could not reach a unanimous decision.2
As a result of the applicable state statutory law in Pennsylvania, the trial
judge dismissed the jury and entered a life sentence against the defendant .
Sattazahn successfully appealed the conviction;4 however, at retrial, the jury
convicted him again of first-degree murder and unanimously agreed to the
sentence of death.5
In a five-to-four decision, the Supreme Court ruled the second death
sentence was not precluded by the Double Jeopardy Clause.6 It reasoned
that the initial sentence was not an "acquittal" of the death penalty since the
life sentence was the product of an operation of law, not a unanimous jury
decision based on factual adjudication.' Because no "acquittal" had
occurred, the defendant was not legally entitled to the original sentence.
8
Furthermore, the majority rejected the dissent's reliance on United States v.
1 537 U.S. 101 (2003).
2 Id. at 103-04.
I d. at 104-05.
4 Id. at 105.
5 Id.
6 Id. at 102.
7 Id. at 109-10.
8 Id. at 109.
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Scott9 for the proposition that double jeopardy protection can extend to
situations where no "acquittal" has occurred. 10
This Note argues that prior Supreme Court cases did not lead to the
conclusion that an "acquittal" was necessary for legal entitlement to a life
sentence."1 Rather, the Pennsylvania statute governing capital sentencing
proceedings created a legal entitlement to a life sentence in the situation of
a hung jury.1 2 In addition, this Note examines two situations where double
jeopardy protection may apply even without factual adjudication of guilt or
innocence: mistrials and termination of a trial in favor of the defendant
before such factual adjudication.' 3 Both situations occurred conceptually in
this case, and the defendant met the threshold requirements for double
jeopardy protection in both situations. 14
II. BACKGROUND
A. THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment states: "No
person shall ... be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy
of life or limb . . .., This clause protects the individual from being
subjected to trial and possible conviction more than once for a particular
crime.16 The rationale behind such a design is straightforward:
the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated
attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to
embarrassment, expense, and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state
of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though
innocent he may be found guilty.
17
9 437 U.S. 82 (1978).
10 Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 102.
" See infra Part VIA. 1.
12 See infra Part VI.A.2.
13 See infra Part VI.B.
14 See infra Part VI.B. As explained infra note 268, this Note does not argue that both
situations actually did occur, as the end result of a mistrial and the end result of termination
of a trial in favor of the defendant are mutually exclusive. Rather, the situation which would
ordinarily have led to a mistrial during the trial phase, a hung jury, occurred in this case,
Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 104, and the Pennsylvania statute mandated termination in favor of
the defendant in such a situation. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711 (c) (West 2004).
15 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
16 Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957).
'7 Id. at 187-88.
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B. THE PENNSYLVANIA STATUTE
The Pennsylvania statute guiding jury instructions in capital
sentencing hearings reads:
(iii) aggravating circumstances 18 must be roved by the Commonwealth beyond a
reasonable doubt; mitigating circumstances must be proved by the defendant by a
preponderance of the evidence.
(iv) the verdict must be a sentence of death if the jury unanimously finds at least one
aggravating circumstance specified in subsection (d) and no mitigating circumstance
or if the jury unanimously finds one or more aggravating circumstances which
outweigh any mitigating circumstances. The verdict must be a sentence of life
imprisonment in all other cases.
(v) the court may, in its discretion, discharge the jury if it is of the opinion that further
deliberation will not result in a unanimous agreement as to the sentence, in which case
the court shall sentence the defendant to life imprisonment.
2 0
The statute essentially states that in order to sentence a defendant to capital
punishment, the jury must unanimously vote for such a sentence. In all
other cases, including when the jury is unable to reach a unanimous
agreement, a defendant receives a life sentence.
C. CASE LAW ON DOUBLE JEOPARDY PROTECTION AT RETRIAL
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment stands for the
principle that a person should not be tried or punished twice for the same
offense.2' In order to establish double jeopardy protection, one must first
show the initial jeopardy has terminated.22 This inquiry is particularly
pertinent for the question of whether a defendant is eligible for the death
penalty at retrial. More specifically, if a defendant is convicted of a crime
eligible for capital punishment and receives a life sentence, and then
successfully appeals the conviction with the result of a retrial, does double
jeopardy prevent the defendant from receiving the death penalty? In other
18 An aggravating circumstance is defined as "[a] fact or situation that increases the
degree of liability or culpability for a tortious or criminal act." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
236 (7th ed. 1999). Pennsylvania lists eighteen aggravating circumstances in the context of
the capital sentencing hearing. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711 (d).
19 A mitigating circumstance is defined as "[a] fact or situation that does not justify or
excuse a wrongful act or offense but that reduces the degree of culpability and thus may
reduce.., the punishment (in a criminal case)." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 18,
at 236. Pennsylvania lists eight mitigating circumstances in the context of the capital
sentencing hearing. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 971 l(e).
20 Id. § 9711 (c).




words, did the jeopardy of capital punishment terminate with the entrance
of the life sentence, or did that jeopardy remain for the retrial?
1. Double Jeopardy Protection Generally Does Not Preclude the Imposition
of a Harsher Sentence at Retrial
The Supreme Court first addressed the issue in Stroud v. United States,
where it ruled that a defendant who received a life sentence at trial could
receive the death penalty at retrial.23 In this case, the defendant was initially
convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death.24 This judgment
was overturned and the defendant was retried.25 At retrial, the jury found
the defendant guilty of first-degree murder "without capital punishment.
26
This judgment too was overturned, and at the second retrial, the defendant
was convicted of first-degree murder; however, the jury made no
recommendation as to whether the conviction was with or without capital
punishment. 27 With the lack of direction from the jury, the judge entered a
death sentence without making additional factual inquiries.28 On appeal,
the defendant claimed the death sentence in the second retrial violated the
Double Jeopardy Clause.29
Justice Day dismissed this argument; he reasoned that the "termination
of jeopardy" inquiry should be focused on the trial of the offense as
opposed to the sentence. 30 Because jeopardy never terminated with respect
to the offense of first-degree murder, the Double Jeopardy Clause provided
no protection. 31  The resulting sentence was merely the result of the
conviction and was not the subject of the inquiry itself.3 2
The Supreme Court reaffirmed Stroud when it decided North Carolina
v. Pearce.33 The Court held the Double Jeopardy Clause did not prevent a
23 251 U.S. 15, 18 (1919).
24 Id. at 16.
25 id.




30 Id. at 18. "The protection afforded by the Constitution is against a second trial for the
same offense." Id.
31 id.
32 Id. "Each conviction was for murder as charged in the indictment, which ...was
murder in the first degree. In the last conviction the jury did not add the words 'without
capital punishment' to the verdict .... In such case the court could do no less than inflict
the death penalty." Id. The implication of this statement is that the sentence is ancillary to
the conviction itself and is not the focus of the Double Jeopardy Clause.
33 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
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harsher sentence at retrial.34 The rationale behind this holding was that "a
corollary of the power to retry a defendant is the power, upon the
defendant's reconviction, to impose whatever sentence may be legally
authorized, whether or not it is greater than the sentence imposed after the
first conviction." 35 However, the Court pointed out that in this case, the
first conviction was overturned at "the defendant's behest."
36
2. Green and Bullington: The Court Establishes Protection in Certain
Circumstances at Retrial
In Green v. United States,37 the Court held that the conviction of
second-degree murder at the first trial, when the jury had the opportunity to
convict on first-degree murder, barred the prosecution from seeking first-
degree murder at retrial.38 In this case, the defendant was tried for an arson
which resulted in the death of a person. 39 The trial judge gave the jury the
instruction that it could find the defendant guilty of first- or second-degree
murder.40 The jury found the defendant guilty of second-degree murder,
and the defendant appealed. 41 At retrial, the defendant was found guilty of
first-degree murder and sentenced to death.42 The Supreme Court reversed
the conviction of the retrial and reasoned "[The defendant] was in direct
peril of being convicted and punished for first degree murder at his first
trial. He was forced to run the gauntlet once on that charge and the jury
refused to convict him.",43 Because the jury only had two choices in the first
trial, to convict on either first-degree or second-degree murder, and chose to
convict on the lesser charge, the defendant was now protected from
prosecution on the greater charge.
Additionally, the Court, in Bullington v. Missouri, declined to extend
the holding in Pearce to a situation where the sentencing procedures "have
34 Id. at 723.
31 Id. at 720.
36 Id. at 721. "[T]he rationale for this [rule]... rests ultimately on the premise that the
original conviction has, at the defendant's behest, been wholly nullified and the slate wiped
clean." Id. at 720-21.
3' 355 U.S. 184 (1957). Although the Court in Green did not specifically address the
issue of double jeopardy protection with respect to different sentences for the same offense,
the analysis is relevant.
" Id. at 191.
39 Id. at 185.
40 Id.
41 Id. at 186.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 190.
2004]
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
the hallmarks of a trial on guilt or innocence.",44 The defendant was tried
and found guilty of the crime of capital murder. 45 During the sentencing
phase, the jury was to take into consideration the existence of aggravating
and mitigating circumstances, and it was also to determine whether the
prosecution and defense had met specific standards of proof for these
circumstances.46 State law provided for only two sentences: death, or life in
prison without the possibility of parole for fifty years.47 In order to
sentence the defendant to death, the jury was required to unanimously
agree.48 If the jury did not unanimously agree for the death penalty, the
defendant would receive life imprisonment.49 The jury unanimously agreed
to a life sentence, and the defendant then entered a motion for a new trial
because of a recent Supreme Court decision. 50 The trial court granted this
motion.51 On retrial, the prosecution provided notice that it intended to seek
the death penalty again.52 The trial court initially disallowed the State from
seeking this sentence, but the Missouri Supreme Court ultimately affirmed
the prosecution's position to seek capital punishment.
53
The Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decision because it
found that the first trial was bifurcated: the first stage consisted of the
determination of guilt or innocence, and the second stage consisted of the
determination of the sentence. 54 While "[t]he imposition of a particular
sentence usually is not regarded as an 'acquittal' of any more severe
sentence that could have been imposed, ' 55 when that sentence is the product
44 451 U.S. 430, 439 (1981).
41 Id. at 435.
46 Id. at 434. In this particular case,
the prosecution would present evidence of two aggravating circumstances specified by the
statute: that "[tihe offense was committed by a person ... who has a substantial history of
serious assaultive criminal convictions," and that "[t]he offense was outrageously or wantonly
vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, or depravity of mind."
Id. at 435 (quoting Mo. RPEv. STAT. § 565.012.2 (1980)).
47 Id. at 432.
41 Id. at 435.
49 Id.
5 Id. at 436. In Duren v. Missouri, the Court "held Missouri's constitutional and
statutory provisions allowing women to claim automatic exemption from jury service
deprived a defendant of his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments right to a jury drawn from a
fair cross-section of the community." Id. (citing Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979)).
Because of Duren, the trial court in Bullinglon awarded the defendant a new trial. Id.
51 Id.
52 Id.
" Id. at 436-37.
14 Id. at 432.
" Id. at 438.
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of a sentencing proceeding, the imposition of the lower sentence is an
acquittal. 6 The reason for this distinction is "[i]n the usual sentencing
proceeding ...it is impossible to conclude that a sentence less than the
statutory maximum 'constitute[s] a decision to the effect that the
government has failed to prove its case,"' 57 whereas, when a capital
sentencing procedure resembles a trial, the jury explicitly determines
whether the prosecution has proved its case.58  Because the defendant
received a sentence which was the product of a trial-like process, the
sentence was protected by the Double Jeopardy Clause.
Even in cases where the capital sentencing proceeding is not conducted
by a jury, the Supreme Court has found that as long as the proceedings are
trial-like, the fact that a judge makes the factual determinations does not
nullify double jeopardy protection. 59 In Arizona v. Rumsey, the trial judge
conducted the capital sentencing proceeding and the requisite factual
inquiries. 60 The court ruled that although the judge-instead of the jury-
played the role of the sentencer, this did not "render the sentencing
proceeding any less like a trial. 61
3. Limitations on Bullington
In Poland v. Arizona,62 the Supreme Court held that double jeopardy
protection did not apply to a retrial sentence of capital punishment when the
sentence of the first trial was also capital punishment, even when the
aggravating circumstance used to support the capital sentence at retrial was
specifically found to have insufficient support at the first trial.63 In this
case, the defendants were found guilty of first-degree murder after robbing
an armored car and killing the two guards by placing them in weighted
sacks and throwing them into a lake.64 The prosecution argued the presence
of two statutory aggravating circumstances: "(1) that [defendants] had
'committed the offense as consideration for the receipt, of [something] of
pecuniary value'; 65 and (2) that [defendants] had 'committed the offense in
56 id.
57 Id. at 443 (quoting MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER
38(1973)).
" Id. at 444.
59 See Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203 (1984).
60 Id. at 205.
61 Id. at 210.
62 476 U.S. 147 (1986).
63 Id. at 150.
64 Id. at 148-49.
65 Id. at 149 (quoting ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-454(E)(5) (West 1973)).
2004]
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an especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner."' 66 In the sentencing
proceeding, the trial judge found insufficient evidence of the "pecuniary
gain" circumstance, but found sufficient evidence of the "depraved manner"
circumstance and sentenced the defendants to death.67  The defendants
appealed. The Arizona Supreme Court reversed and ordered a new trial
because it found insufficient evidence to support the "depraved manner"
circumstance. 68  At retrial, the defendants were again convicted and
sentenced to death.69 The sentence ultimately rested on the "pecuniary
advantage" circumstance, which the first trial judge found not to be
present. 70
Affirming the second death sentence, the Supreme Court stated "the
relevant inquiry in the cases before us is whether the sentencing judge or
the reviewing court has 'decid(ed] that the prosecution has not proved its
case' for the death penalty and hence has 'acquitted' petitioners.' With
the inquiry set, the Supreme Court ruled that the use of an aggravating
circumstance to support the second sentence of death, which was not
present at the first sentence of death, did not violate double jeopardy
because the prosecution proved its case for the death penalty in the first
trial.72 The Court reasoned that "[a]ggravating circumstances are not
separate penalties or offenses, but are 'standards to guide the making of
[the] choice' between the alternative verdicts of death and life
imprisonment., 73 Because the defendants could not be "acquitted" of the
"pecuniary gain" circumstance, the prosecution could use this circumstance
at retrial.74
Further limiting the scope of Bullington, the Court also held that
Bullington did not apply in a noncapital case.75 In Monge v. California,76
the defendant was convicted of a felony related to the sale of marijuana.77
In a separate sentencing phase, the prosecution sought to prove that the
defendant had been convicted of a prior serious felony. 78 Under California
66 Id. (quoting ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-454(E)(6) (West 1973)).
67 Id. at 149.
61 Id. at 150.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 151.
7' Id. at 154.
72 Id. at 154.
73 Id. at 156 (quoting Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 438 (1981)).
74 id.
75 See Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721 (1998).
76 Id.
77 Id. at 724-25.
78 Id. at 725.
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law, if the prosecution proved this circumstance, the defendant's maximum
sentence could be doubled. 79 The trial court did find this circumstance, and
sentenced the defendant to double the maximum term for the drug charge.
80
The defendant appealed, and the appellate court found insufficient evidence
to support the "prior serious felony" circumstance.81 The appellate court
then disallowed a retrial to prove the circumstance because it believed such
a retrial would violate double jeopardy principles.82 The California
Supreme Court reversed this decision and allowed a retrial so that
prosecutors could again attempt to prove the "prior serious felony"
circumstance.83
The Supreme Court affirmed this decision by limiting Bullington to
84capital situations. In its distinction between capital and noncapital
sentencing proceedings, the Court noted the unique nature of the
punishment of death and the need for greater reliability provided by capital
sentencing proceedings.85  The Court further reasoned that trial-like
proceedings in noncapital cases were not constitutionally required, but were
merely extra protection provided by the state.8 6 Under the Court's holding,
a defendant in a noncapital case is not legally entitled to a prior sentence,
even if such a sentence was the result of a trial-like proceeding. 7
III. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
In April 1987, David Sattazahn and Jeffrey Scott Hammer made
preparations to rob a restaurant.88 Through surveillance, the two learned
that the restaurant conducted most of its business on Sundays.8 9 They also
learned that Richard Boyer, the manager of the restaurant, closed the
restaurant each night, and that each night he carried the bank deposit bag
with the day's receipts.90 Sattazahn and Hammer obtained two handguns,
79 Id. at 724 (citing CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 667(d)(1) and (e)(1)(2) (West 1998)).
8' Id. at 725.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 726.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 734.
85 Id. at 732.
86 Id. at 733.
87 Id. at 734. As Justice Stevens points out, if the prosecution at retrial proves the "prior
serious felony" circumstance, the defendant automatically receives an additional five years
to his sentence. Id. at 735 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
88 Petitioner's Brief at 3, Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101 (2003) (No. 01-7574).




ammunition, and other supplies. 91 Their plan was to rob Boyer and then
handcuff him.
92
On Sunday, April 12, 1987, Sattazahn and Hammer waited for Boyer
to exit the restaurant after closing in order to rob him of the deposit bag.93
At approximately 11:00 p.m., Boyer left the restaurant and approached his
automobile. 94 Sattazahn and Hammer approached the manager and told him
to drop the deposit bag and put up his hands.95 Boyer put his hands up but
flung the deposit bag towards the restaurant. 96 Sattazahn forced Boyer to
retrieve the bag, but Boyer attempted to throw the bag onto the roof of the
restaurant and then proceeded to flee.97 Sattazahn fired the first shot, and
Hammer fired a warning shot in the air.98 Sattazahn fired several more
shots and Boyer collapsed. 99 Sattazahn and Hammer retrieved the bag and
the two fled the scene.' 
00
Sattazahn was arrested for the murder of Richard Boyer and related
crimes on July 17, 1989.101 The prosecution sought the death penalty for
Sattazahn.' 0 2 Hammer was also charged and plead guilty to third-degree
murder, robbery, and related charges.1
0 3
IV. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
At Sattazahn's trial, Hammer served as a primary witness for the
Commonwealth.'1 4 During the trial, Hammer related the events of the
crime, and testified that Sattazahn carried a .22 caliber handgun and that he
carried a .41 caliber handgun. 0 5 The autopsy of Boyer showed that he had
been shot five times, and that all wounds were consistent with being
inflicted by .22 caliber bullets. 0 6 On May 9, 1991, the jury convicted
91 Petitioner's Brief at 3, Sattazahn (No. 01-7574).
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Respondent's Brief at 1, Sattazahn (No. 01-7574).
" id. at 1-2.





1" Id. at 1.
102 Id.
103 Id. at I n. 1.
104 id.
05 Id. at 1-2.
'06 Id. at 2.
[Vol. 94
SA TTAZAHN v. PENNSYLVANIA
Sattazahn of first-, second-, and third-degree murder, robbery, and other
related crimes, and the case proceeded to a capital sentencing hearing.'
0 7
During the capital sentencing hearing, the trial court provided
instructions on Pennsylvania law relating to when the jury can sentence a
defendant to death.10 8 In order to institute a capital punishment, the jury
must unanimously find at least one aggravating circumstance and no
mitigating circumstances, or the jury must unanimously find at least one
aggravating circumstance which outweighs any mitigating circumstances.' 09
In all other circumstances, the sentence must be life imprisonment."10 The
Commonwealth bore the burden of proving the aggravating circumstance(s)
beyond a reasonable doubt, whereas the defendant bore the burden of
proving the mitigating circumstances by a preponderance of the evidence."l
Additionally, under the Pennsylvania statute, the trial court may discharge
the jury if it believes that further deliberation will not result in a unanimous
verdict." 2 In these situations, the court is statutorily mandated to enter a
sentence of life imprisonment." 3 The Commonwealth presented evidence
of the aggravating circumstance that the defendant committed the murder in
the perpetration of a felony. 14 The defendant presented evidence of two
mitigating circumstances: the defendant's lack of a significant criminal
history and the defendant's age at the time of the crime.'
After three and one-half hours of deliberation, the jury returned with a
note stating it was hopelessly deadlocked, nine-to-three, in favor of life
imprisonment." 6  Sattazahn moved to discharge the jury and enter the
mandated life sentence." 7 The court refused to discharge the jury until it
could determine whether further deliberations could possibly result in a
unanimous verdict." 8 After its examination, the trial court concluded that
further deliberations would not result in a unanimous verdict." 9  It
discharged the jury and stated its intention to sentence Sattazahn to life
'07 Id. at 2-3.
108 Petitioner's Brief at 4-5, Sattazahn (No. 01-7574).
109 Id. at 4.
110 Id.
111 Id.
112 Id. at 6.
113 Id. at 5-6.
114 Respondent's Brief at 2 n.2, Sattazahn (No. 01-7574).
115 Id.
116 Petitioner's Brief at 6, Sattazahn (No. 01-7574).






imprisonment on May 10, 1991.12 The court formally sentenced Sattazahn
to this term on February 14, 1992.121 Between September 19, 1991 and
April 1, 1992, Sattazahn plead guilty to a number of other independent
crimes, including third degree murder, robbery, and burglary.
12
Sattazahn appealed his conviction relating to the murder of Richard
Boyer on March 12, 1992.23 The Pennsylvania Superior Court reversed his
convictions on two points: first, the court ruled that the evidence at trial was
insufficient to support convictions on some of the related crimes and
dismissed those charges. 24 Additionally, the court ruled that the trial judge
had erred in instructing the jury on the remaining charges, including the
charge of murder. 2 ' As a result, the court reversed and remanded for a new
trial on those charges.
126
With respect to the retrial, the Commonwealth stated that it was again
preparing to seek the death penalty. 12 7  In addition to the original
aggravating circumstance of murder in the commission of a felony, the
Commonwealth also sought to prove the additional aggravating
circumstance "that the defendant had a significant criminal history of felony
convictions involving the use or threat of violence to the person.' 28 This
additional aggravating circumstance was predicated on the guilty pleas
Sattazahn entered into for various crimes after the first trial had ended.
19
After the Commonwealth filed notice to seek the death penalty,
Sattazahn moved to prevent the Commonwealth from seeking the death
penalty for the retrial and to prevent the Commonwealth from proving the
second aggravating circumstance.130 The Court of Common Pleas denied
the motion, and the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the decision.' 3'
The Superior Court based its decision on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
decision in Commonwealth v. Martorano,132 which stated that when the jury
did not reach a unanimous verdict in a capital sentencing phase, the
resulting life sentence was not an acquittal of the death penalty, and so did
120 Petitioner's Brief at 6, Sattazahn (No. 01-7574).
121 Id.
122 Respondent's Brief at 3, Satazahn (No. 01-7574).
123 Petitioner's Brief at 7, Sattazahn (No. 01-7574).
124 Respondent's Brief at 3, Sattazahn (No. 01-7574).
125 id.
126 Id.
127 Id. at 4.
128 Id. at 5 n.6.
129 Id. at 3-4.
130 Id. at 4.
131 id.
132 634 A.2d 1063 (Pa. 1993).
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not invoke double jeopardy protection from a subsequent capital
sentence. 33  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court declined to review the
decision.
134
On retrial, Sattazahn was convicted of the first-degree murder of
Richard Boyer and other related charges.' 35 During the capital sentencing
phase, the jury unanimously voted for the death penalty. 136 The trial court
subsequently imposed the formal sentence of death on February 16, 1999.137
Sattazahn appealed his conviction to the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court.1 38 He argued that his life sentence was the product of a Pennsylvania
statute which mandated a life sentence in cases with hung juries; his
contention was that this life sentence was an "acquittal" in the same sense
that a unanimous verdict for a life sentence is an "acquittal" of capital
punishment, so that he was entitled to double jeopardy protection from a
capital sentence at retrial. 1
39
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected this argument, stating that a
hung jury did not result in an acquittal on the merits because the judge had
no discretion on the sentence: Pennsylvania law mandated the judge to
sentence Sattazahn to life imprisonment. 40  In this situation, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court deemed, because the judgment was not based
on factual findings, no legal entitlement to the original sentence existed.
141
Additionally, Sattazahn argued that the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments precluded the Commonwealth from
seeking the death penalty at retrial because such an ability on the
Commonwealth's part would have a chilling effect on the defendant's right
to appeal; a defendant would have to make the difficult choice between
acceptance of a life sentence and appeal with the possibility of capital
punishment. 42 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected this argument as
well, noting that the United States Supreme Court had rejected a similar line
of argumentation.1
43




137 Id. at 8-9.
138 Id. at 9.
139 Id.
140 Id. at 9-10.
141 Id. at 10-11.
142 Commonwealth v. Sattazahn, 763 A.2d 359, 368 (Pa. 2000).
143 Id. (citing Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 30, 35 (1973)).
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On December 17, 2001, Sattazahn filed a petition for writ of certiorari,
and the United States Supreme Court granted the petition.' 44 The Court
addressed two issues: (1) whether the Double Jeopardy Clause prevented
Pennsylvania from seeking the death penalty at Sattazahn's retrial, and (2)
whether the Due Process Clause prevented Pennsylvania from seeking the
death penalty at Sattazahn's retrial.14
5
V. SUMMARY OF OPINIONS
A. MAJORITY OPINION
The Supreme Court held, in a five-to-four decision authored by Justice
Scalia, that double jeopardy protection did not extend to Sattazahn. 46
Relying on Bullington, the Court stated that the primary inquiry into
whether the Double Jeopardy Clause barred an imposition of the death
penalty on retrial is whether the defendant received an "acquittal" of the
death penalty in the previous trial.147 Armed with this test, the Court held
that double jeopardy protection did not extend to Sattazahn because his life
sentence was the result of a statutory default rule in the case of a hung jury,
a situation which was not an "acquittal.', 148 Additionally, the Court held
that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment did not give
greater protection than that provided by the Double Jeopardy Clause. 149
The Court made explicit that the proper inquiry is not whether
Sattazahn received a life sentence' in the first trial; rather, "the touchstone
for double-jeopardy protection in capital sentencing proceedings is whether
there has been an 'acquittal." ' 50 The Court then applied this standard to the
facts in this case, and found that the hung jury in Sattazahn's first capital
sentencing proceeding produced a "non-result," not an acquittal, and
Sattazahn was accordingly not afforded double jeopardy protection."
Furthermore, the Supreme Court ruled that the entry of a life sentence
by the trial judge as a result of Pennsylvania statute was not an acquittal. 52
144 Petitioner's Brief at 11, Sattazahn (No. 01-7574).
145 Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 115 (2003).
146 Id. at 110-I . Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas
joined the opinion with respect to Parts I, II, IV, and V. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Thomas joined the opinion with respect to Part III. Id. at 102.
141 Id. at 109.
148 Id.
14 Id. at 116.
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In order for an acquittal to occur, the Court reasoned, the judge must make a
judgment based on factual findings.15 3 In this case, however, the trial judge
made a judgment based on an operation of law, not on factual findings.' 54
The Court concluded that a mechanical entry of a life sentence based on
statutory compulsion was not the same as an acquittal due to factual
findings and did not carry a "legal entitlement" to a life sentence. 
55
However, the Court recognized the Pennsylvania legislature could
have intended a legal entitlement to a life sentence in the case of a hung
jury.156 The Court ultimately rejected this argument, however, because the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not find such an intent in the statute, and
the Pennsylvania legislature may have had other intentions in mind.'S
Because of the state's interest in closure, and its interest in conservation of
resources, the Court reasoned, the state may be willing to accept a life
sentence with a hung jury, but not when the case is to be re-litigated. 58
Whether the Pennsylvania legislature intended to create a legal entitlement
to the life sentence for defendants such as Sattazahn was unclear at best, the
Court concluded.15 9
Additionally, the Court restated its holding from Apprendi v New
Jersey160 by ruling that the proper standard for the jury to find an
aggravating circumstance in the first trial was beyond a reasonable doubt.' 6'
In Apprendi, the Court held "if the existence of any fact (other than a prior
conviction) increases the maximum punishment that may be imposed on a
defendant, that fact-no matter how the State labels it--constitutes an
element, and must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt."' '62 The
' Id. at 109-10.
154 id.
155 Id. at 110 (quoting Commonwealth v. Sattazahn, 763 A.2d 359, 367 (Pa. 2000), which





160 530 U.S. 466 (2000). In this case, the defendant fired shots into the home of an
African American family who had moved into the previously all-white neighborhood. Id. at
469. The defendant later made a statement that he did so because he did not want African
Americans living in the neighborhood. Id. Although the firearm charge carried a five to ten
year sentence, the New Jersey hate crime statute allowed an enhanced sentence if the judge
found by a preponderance of the evidence that the crime was committed in an attempt to
intimidate a person or group because of race. Id. at 470. The Supreme Court ruled the hate
crime statute unconstitutional, and held any fact which would increase the maximum
punishment must be found beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury. Id. at 496-97.




corollary to this holding is that "[i]f a jury unanimously concludes that a
State has failed to meet its burden of proving the existence of one or more
aggravating circumstances, double-jeopardy protections attach to that
'acquittal."",163  However, at Sattazahn's first trial, the jury did not
unanimously conclude that Pennsylvania did not meet its burden with
respect to the aggravating circumstance; the jury was hung during the
capital sentencing phase. 64  As a result, Sattazahn's "'jeopardy' never
terminated with respect" to the capital sentencing phase. 1
65
Next, the Court rebutted the arguments set forth by the dissent,
beginning with the dissent's reliance on United States v. Scott.'66 First, the
majority rejected the dissent's interpretation of Scott that "double jeopardy
'may' attach when the 'trial judge terminates the proceedings favorably to
the defendant on a basis not related to factual guilt or innocence' ' ' 67 by
noting that the text relied upon is in dictum and that "[i]t would be a thin
reed on which to rest a hitherto unknown constitutional prohibition of the
entirely rational course of making a hung jury's failure to convict
provisionally final, subject to change if the case must be retried anyway.' ' 68
Second, the Court distinguished Scott because the dictum in that case
stated double jeopardy protection may apply when the defendant receives a
favorable termination not based on a factual determination when he, "at
least insisted on having the issue of guilt submitted to the first trier of
fact."' 169 In this case, Sattazahn did not make such an insistence but instead
called for a life sentence based on procedural grounds.170 Finally, the Court
stated that this case fell outside the zone of protection that the Double
Jeopardy Clause created, because it "hardly presents the specter of 'an all-
powerful state relentlessly pursuing a defendant who had either been found
not guilty or who had at least insisted on having the issue of guilt submitted
to the first trier of fact.""' 17' The Court concluded that "the case is, except
for [the sentencing] issue, at an end,"'172 but the state could later attempt to
resolve the open issue of the death penalty.
73
163 Id. at 112.
164 Id. at 112-13.
161 Id. at 113.
166 437 U.S. 82 (1978).
167 Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 113 (quoting Scott, 437 U.S. at 92).
168 Id. at 113-14.
169 Id. at 113 (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted) (quoting Scott, 437 U.S. at
96).
170 Id. at 114.
171 Id. at 114-15 (quoting Scott, 437 U.S. at 96).
172 Id. at 115.
173 Id. (quoting Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 509 (1978)).
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Finally, the Court rejected Sattazahn's due process claim by stating
"[n]othing indicates that any 'life' or 'liberty' interest that Pennsylvania law
may have given petitioner in the life sentence imposed after his first capital-
sentencing proceeding was somehow immutable. 1 74 At the heart of the
majority's dismissal was the notion that Sattazahn's due process claim was
essentially the same as his double jeopardy claim; it concluded that
the Due Process Clause did not give "greater double-jeopardy protection
than ... the Double Jeopardy Clause."'1
75
B. CONCURRING OPINION
In a concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor agreed with all of the
arguments set forth by the majority except for the argument premised on
Apprendi.176 She stated, "[ilt remains my view that 'Apprendi's rule that
any fact that increases the maximum penalty must be treated as an element
of the crime is not required by the Constitution, by history, or by our prior
cases.""
177
Justice O'Connor reiterated the idea that a hung jury is not an
'acquittal,' and therefore does not implicate double jeopardy protection with
respect to a capital sentencing proceeding. 78 She based her argument on
the idea that with a hung jury, no decision is actually made because the jury
"[does] not make any findings about the existence of the aggravating or
mitigating circumstances.' 79 As a result, double jeopardy protection did
not attach.' 80
C. DISSENTING OPINION
The dissenting opinion, authored by Justice Ginsburg, stated double
jeopardy protection should apply to a final judgment that is the product of a
statutory mandate.' 8' The dissent pointed out that, while the majority
argued double jeopardy protection extends only to situations where the
defendant has been acquitted, double jeopardy jurisprudence did not
warrant such a conclusion. 82 Instead, the dissent asserted, "the question is
174 Id. at 115-16.
171 Id. at 116.
176 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
177 Id. at 117 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 619
(2002) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)).
178 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
179 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
180 Id. at 118 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
181 Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyerjoined the dissent.
182 Id. at 119 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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genuinely debatable" whether a final judgment outside of an acquittal
would be protected by the Double Jeopardy Clause.'83 The dissent
concluded that the mandatory nature of the life sentence as derived from
Pennsylvania law created a legal entitlement to such sentence, and was
therefore within the realm of double jeopardy protection. 184
The dissent began by describing the finality of the life sentence
imposed by the first trial: the sentence alone could not be appealed or
retried by the prosecution. 185 Because the government may not separately
appeal the sentence, the implication was that such a sentence is final.
86
Turning then to United States v. Scott,'87 the dissent asserted that
double jeopardy protection may apply even in a case without an acquittal:
[T]his Court has also developed a body of law guarding the separate but related
interest of a defendant in avoiding multiple prosecutions even where no final
determination of guilt or innocence has been made .... Such interests," we observed,
"may be involved in two different situations: the first, in which the trial judge declares
a mistrial; the second, in which the trial judge terminates the proceedings favorably to
the defendant on a basis not related to factual guilt or innocence."'
188
In the context of the first situation, when a hung jury causes a mistrial, the
defendant can be reprosecuted. 89 With respect to the second situation, the
dissent argued that "[w]hen a motion to terminate is granted, . . . the trial
court 'obviously contemplates that the proceedings will terminate then and
there in favor of the defendant."" 90 However, the dissent also noted that,
even in the second situation, double jeopardy protection may not apply in
specific cases.' 91 If a defendant makes the motion to terminate before an
adjudication on factual innocence or guilt, then the defendant can be re-
prosecuted even if her motion is successful. 192 In Scott, the defendant was
denied double jeopardy protection because he was the person who made the
motion to terminate. 93 The implication of this logic, the dissent argued, is
that in cases where the court terminated the proceedings, double jeopardy
protection would apply. 194 Sattazahn's case was a situation where the court
183 Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
184 Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
185 Id. at 118 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
186 Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
187 437 U.S. 82 (1978).
88 Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 120 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Scott, 437 U.S. at 92).
189 Id. at 121 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
190 Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Scott, 437 U.S. at 94).
191 Id. at 122 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
192 Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
193 Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Scott, 437 U.S. at 98-99).
194 Id. at 123 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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dismissed the jury and terminated the proceedings, so Sattazahn should be
protected by the Double Jeopardy Clause. 95
The dissent was also concerned with the "continuing state of anxiety
and insecurity" Sattazahn endured as a result of the second trial. 96 It
reasoned that Pennsylvania already had "one complete opportunity"'' 97 to
prosecute Sattazahn, and that Sattazahn was required to bear the emotional
stress of one trial.198 However, with a retrial, Sattazahn was "forced to run
the gantlet" a second time.199
Finally, the dissent pointed to two factors which weighed in
Sattazahn's favor. First, if double jeopardy protection does not apply in a
situation with a hung jury during the capital sentencing phase, then
defendants such as Sattazahn will have a "perilous choice" between an
appeal but with the risk of the death penalty, or a life sentence. 200 Second,
the penalty of death is "unique in both its severity and its finality. 20'
Sattazahn had already faced such a penalty, and to subject him to the same
stress twice did not comport with the spirit of double jeopardy protection.202
VI. ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court incorrectly held that the Double Jeopardy Clause
did not protect David Sattazahn from a capital sentence at retrial. The
Court should have extended double jeopardy protection to defendants who
receive life sentences as a result of statutory mandate. While the jury at the
capital sentencing phase of the first trial did not reach a unanimous
decision, this fact alone should not deny double jeopardy protection. First,
the Court unfairly made a unanimous jury decision for life imprisonment a
necessary requirement for a "legal entitlement" to the sentence of life
imprisonment, even though the plain language of the Pennsylvania statute
directs otherwise. Second, jeopardy can end in the situations of a mistrial
and termination in favor of the defendant before factual adjudication. The
Court's previous analysis in these two situations leads to the conclusion that
195 Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
196 Id. at 124 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Green
v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957)).
197 Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Arizona v.
Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 509 (1978)).
198 Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
199 Id. at 125 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Green, 355 U.S. at 190).
200 Id. at 126 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
201 Id. at 127 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721, 732 (1998)).
202 Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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the Double Jeopardy Clause should have barred the prosecution from
seeking the death penalty at Sattazahn's retrial.
A. SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE
CONTENTION THAT AN ACQUITTAL IS A NECESSARY CONDITION
FOR DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE PROTECTION.
Prior Supreme Court cases do not address whether a defendant can
receive legal entitlement to a sentence without an acquittal from a
unanimous jury decision.20 3 As a result, the Court's decision to require
such an acquittal for a legal entitlement to a life sentence in the context of a
capital sentencing hearing was unfounded and conclusory in its analysis.
Moreover, not only did the Supreme Court create a necessary condition for
a legal entitlement from whole cloth, it also largely ignored the legal
entitlement explicitly created by the Pennsylvania legislature.
1. An Acquittal by a Unanimous Jury Should Not Be a Necessary Condition
for a Legal Entitlement to a Life Sentence in the Capital Sentencing Context
The Supreme Court erred in its reliance on the word "acquittal" to
dismiss Sattazahn's claim of double jeopardy protection. While an acquittal
may be sufficient to create a legal entitlement, it is not necessary to do so.
The majority opinion makes use of two key phrases: "acquittal" and
"legal entitlement." The logical starting point of the analysis, then, is the
origin and context of these phrases in the Court's double jeopardy
jurisprudence. In Bullington v. Missouri, °4 the Court began by addressing
what was not an acquittal: "The imposition of a particular sentence usually
is not regarded as an 'acquittal' of any more severe sentence that could have
been imposed., 20 5 However, when the defendant receives a life sentence by
a jury through a trial-like capital sentencing proceeding, such a sentence
meant that the jury had acquitted the defendant of the death penalty.0 6
Although a sentence in general is not an acquittal of a harsher sentence,
when a jury issues a life sentence in a capital sentencing proceeding, the
sentence acts as an acquittal of the harsher sentence of the death penalty. It
is important to note that in the facts specific to Bullington, the jury
203 See supra Part 1I.
204 451 U.S. 430 (1981).
205 Id. at 438.
206 Id. at 445 (quoting State ex rel. Westfall v. Mason, 594 S.W.2d 908, 922 (Mo. 1980)
(Bardgett, C.J., dissenting)).
[Vol. 94
SA TTAZAHN v. PENNSYLVANIA
"acquitted" the defendant of the death penalty by unanimously voting for
the sentence of life imprisonment.
2 0 7
The phrase "legal entitlement" derives its relevancy from Arizona v.
Rumsey.208 In that case, the Court stated:
The trial court entered findings denying the existence of each of the seven statutory
aggravating circumstances, and as required by state law, the court then entered
judgment in respondent's favor on the issue of death. That judgment, based on
findings sufficient to establish legal entitlement to the life sentence, amounts to an
acquittal on the merits .... 209
This dictum suggests that factual findings can be sufficient to establish legal
entitlement to a life sentence, but it does not suggest that factual findings
are necessary to establish legal entitlement. 21 0 Additionally, the dictum also
suggests that a judgment of life imprisonment based on factual findings
amounts to an acquittal of the death penalty.211
In addition to the Court's use of these phrases, Black's Law Dictionary
defines "acquittal" as "[t]he legal certification, usu. by jury verdict, that an
accused person is not guilty of the charged offense. 212  It defines
"entitlement" as "[a]n absolute right to a (usu. monetary) benefit, such as




The question then becomes how "acquittal" and "legal entitlement" are
related in the context of a capital sentencing hearing. From the assumptions
and definitions aforementioned, the Court in Bullington ruled that an
acquittal in the form of a unanimous jury decision to sentence a defendant
to life imprisonment was sufficient to create a legal entitlement to that
214sentence. In a broader ruling, the Court acknowledged in Rumsey that a
judgment based on factual findings was also sufficient to create a legal
entitlement. 215 Essentially, the Court gave two paths to a legal entitlement
211 Id. at 436. Although the facts described by the Court do not explicitly state the jury
was unanimous in its decision to sentence the defendant to life imprisonment, such a
circumstance can be inferred by the fact that "the jury returned its additional verdict fixing
petitioner's punishment not at death, but at imprisonment for life." Id. at 435-36. The
Missouri statute did not allow the jury to return a sentence if it could not unanimously agree
on a sentence; in those cases, the statute mandated the judge to institute a life sentence, much
like the Pennsylvania statute in this case. Mo. REv. STAT. § 565.006.2 (1980).




212 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 18, at 24.
213 Id. at 553.
214 Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 445 (1981).
215 Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 211 (1984).
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to a life sentence protected by the Double Jeopardy Clause: a favorable
unanimous jury verdict and a favorable judgment based on factual findings.
However, the Court never stated that these were the only means of creating
such an entitlement.
On the other hand, the Court has also clearly expressed what
conditions are not sufficient to create a legal entitlement in a prior sentence.
In Poland v. Arizona, the Supreme Court held that defendants who are
sentenced to capital punishment at the first trial do not have a legal
entitlement to a life sentence at retrial, even though the aggravating
circumstance, which was the basis for the capital sentence, was later found
to be insufficiently supported by the evidence. 21 6 Additionally, in Monge v.
California, the Court held that a trial-like sentencing phase was not
sufficient to create a legal entitlement to the sentence at the first trial.2" 7
The facts in Monge described a noncapital case, and the Court held that
Bullington only extended to capital cases.21 8
In sum, the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court on when a defendant is
legally entitled to a prior sentence subject to the protection of the Double
Jeopardy Clause can be delineated into a handful of simple rules:
* The case must be a capital case.
* The sentencing phase must have the "hallmarks of [a] trial on guilt
or innocence."
219
* A unanimous jury verdict for life imprisonment is sufficient to
create a legal entitlement to that sentence so that the Double
Jeopardy Clause prohibits the death penalty at retrial.
* A judgment made on factual findings for a life sentence is
sufficient to create a legal entitlement to that sentence so that the
Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits the death penalty at retrial.
* A judgment made on factual findings for a capital sentence is
insufficient to create a legal entitlement to a life sentence, even
when said factual findings are erroneous.
The facts in Sattazahn satisfied both threshold requirements: capital
punishment was an available sentence, and the sentencing phase was trial-
like in its adjudication of aggravating and mitigating factors.220  Also,
Sattazahn did not receive a capital sentence at the first trial, so a legal
entitlement to his life sentence was not forever lost.22' However, the facts
216 476 U.S. 147, 154 (1986).
217 524 U.S. 721, 731-32 (1998).
218 id.
219 Bullington, 451 U.S. at 439.
220 Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 103-04 (2003).
221 Id. at 105.
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in Sattazahn did not satisfy either of the sufficient conditions for a legal
entitlement to his life sentence.
At this point, one would expect the Supreme Court to analyze whether
a person who receives a life sentence outside of a unanimous jury decision
or a judgment based on factual findings is legally entitled to his sentence,
and, if so, under what conditions. Instead, the Supreme Court peremptorily
rejected Sattazahn's claim on the grounds that his life sentence was the
result of a procedural mechanism and not the product of a factual inquiry.
The majority stated:
Under Pennsylvania's sentencing scheme, the judge has no discretion to fashion the
sentence once he finds that the jury is deadlocked. The statute directs him to enter a
life sentence .... The judge makes no findings and resolves no factual matter. Since
judgment is not based on findings which resolve some factual matter, it is not
sufficient to establish legal entitlement to a life sentence. A default judgment does not
trigger a double jeopardy bar to the death penalty upon retrial. 22
2
The reasoning of the Court is somewhat troubling. Its ultimate
conclusion was that a judgment based on resolution of factual matters is the
only way to sufficiently establish a legal entitlement.223 However, this
statement is completely conclusory; in no prior case did the Supreme Court
hold that a such a judgment was either necessary or exclusively sufficient to
create a legal entitlement to a life sentence with double jeopardy protection,
nor does this conclusion follow from any of its prior decisions.224  In
addition, the Court gave no policy reasons why a judgment that is the
product of an operation of the law is somehow deficient in comparison to a
judgment that is the product of factual matters with respect to double
jeopardy protection.
The Supreme Court's leap in logic was especially apparent in its
application of Apprendi v. New Jersey.22 5  The holding of Apprendi
essentially stated that "if the existence of any fact (other than a prior
conviction) increases the maximum punishment that may be imposed on a
defendant, that fact-no matter how the State labels it-constitutes an
element, and must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt."226 As
applied to Sattazahn's case, this holding directed that if the jury wanted to
seek a capital sentence, it must find the aggravating circumstance(s) beyond
21 Id. at 109-10 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Sattazahn v.
Commonwealth, 763 A.2d 359, 367 (Pa. 2000)).
223 Id. at 110.
224 See supra Part II.
225 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
226 Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 111 (citing Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 482-84, 490).
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a reasonable doubt.227 Conversely, if the jury did not find the aggravating
circumstance(s) beyond a reasonable doubt, then the jury could not sentence
Sattazahn to death. These are the only two logical endpoints of Apprendi.
In no way can the Apprendi holding be construed to mean that in order to
acquit the defendant from the death penalty, the jury must unanimously
decide for life imprisonment.
However, the Court's construction is exactly that: it wrote "if the
petitioner's first sentencing jury had unanimously concluded that
Pennsylvania failed to prove any aggravating circumstances, that
conclusion would operate as an 'acquittal' of the greater offense. 228 While
this was true, this statement could be derived entirely from the Court's
decision in Bullington v. Missouri.229 This was merely a recapitulation of
the idea that a unanimous verdict is sufficient to establish a legal
entitlement. The Court never explained how the holding in Apprendi led
from the reasoning in Bullington to the conclusion that "there was no
double-jeopardy bar" from Pennsylvania seeking the death penalty.23°
Apprendi did not stand for the proposition that in order to have a legal
entitlement to a life sentence, a defendant must have received that sentence
through a unanimous jury verdict.
If anything, the holding of Apprendi cut in favor of Sattazahn. As
previously stated, one logical conclusion from Apprendi is if the jury did
not find the aggravating circumstance(s) beyond a reasonable doubt, then
the jury could not sentence the defendant to death. In other words, the
defendant in that situation would have a legal entitlement not to receive a
capital sentence. At the very least, the defendant's situation qualifies under
a strict definition of "entitlement": the defendant's right not to receive a
capital sentence is "absolute '2 31 after the meeting of a "requirement ' 232
(here the jury's inability to find the aggravating circumstance(s) beyond a
reasonable doubt). The facts in Sattazahn fit exactly this situation: the jury
was deadlocked nine-to-three in favor of life imprisonment. 3  The jury
explicitly did not find the aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable
227 See generally Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
228 Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 112.
229 451 U.S. 430, 445 (1981).
230 Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 113.
231 See supra note 213 and accompanying text. Under Apprendi and Ring, if the jury
does not find the aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury may never
institute the death penalty. See Ring, 536 U.S. 584; Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466
(2000).
232 See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
233 Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 104.
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doubt. As such, the Apprendi holding appeared to give Sattazahn legal
entitlement not to receive the death penalty.
2. The Pennsylvania Legislature Created a Clear Legal Entitlement to a
Life Sentence in the Situation of a Hung Jury
Perhaps most perplexing is the Supreme Court's dismissal of
Sattazahn's legal entitlement to a life sentence as explicitly established by
the Pennsylvania legislature. The statute which guides the sentencing
proceedings in capital cases states: "the court may, in its discretion,
discharge the jury if it is of the opinion that further deliberation will not
result in a unanimous agreement as to the sentence, in which case the court
shall sentence the defendant to life imprisonment. 2 34 As correctly pointed
out by the majority, the judge has no choice but to give the defendant life
imprisonment if she determines the jury will not reach a unanimous
verdict.235 This lack of "discretion" is the result of a direct legislative
command to impose such a sentence if this factual situation occurs.
There can be no doubt that such a command establishes an "absolute
right;"2 36 in no way does the Pennsylvania legislature qualify its mandate
with any form of exception. 37 The plain language of the statute denotes
that in every instance where the judge determines the jury to be hung in the
capital sentencing proceeding, the judge must give the defendant a sentence
of life imprisonment.238  Additionally, the "legal requirement '23 9 in this
situation is a judge-made determination that the jury will not reach a
unanimous verdict. 240 According to the clear direction of Pennsylvania law,
once the defendant meets this threshold requirement, then the defendant
absolutely receives the right to a life sentence.2 4' The facts in Sattazahn
met this requirement: the judge determined that the jury would not reach a
unanimous verdict, so the governing statute forced the hand of the judge to
give Sattazahn a life sentence.242 The lack of discretion given to the judge
is a clear indication that the legislature intended this result in all cases, i.e.,
the right to this life sentence is "absolute."
234 Id. (quoting 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 971 1(c)(iv) (West 2004)).
235 Id. at 109.
236 See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
237 § 9711 (c).
238 Id. § 9711 (c)(iv).
239 See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
240 § 9711 (c)(iv).
241 Id. § 9711(c)(iv).
242 Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 104-05.
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The majority addressed the legal entitlement created by the
Pennsylvania legislature with arguments couched in terms of legislative
intent. Justice Scalia gave two possible, interrelated reasons why the
Pennsylvania legislature may have intended to deprive a defendant in
Sattazahn's position of legal entitlement to the life sentence. First, Justice
Scalia emphasized that the State may want closure, so it is willing to give a
default judgment in the case of a hung jury; however, if that closure is
going to be disturbed anyway by a retrial, the default judgment should not
be considered final.243 Second, the State may want to conserve resources,
so it may give a default judgment in lieu of another proceeding; however, if
the State must spend its resources for retrial, the reason for giving the
default judgment no longer applies. 244
These arguments hypothesizing legislative intent have several
problems. Even if the legislature intended to create no legal entitlement to a
life sentence that is the result of a hung jury, no barrier exists for the
legislature to put this language into the statute itself. The legislature could
have easily included such a clause, and it would not be subject to excessive
financial burdens as a result. However, such a clause is not in the statute.
The proof of intent is most clearly manifested in the statute itself; the
absence of such language is strong evidence that the legislature did not
intend to deprive Sattazahn of a legal entitlement to his life sentence.
Additionally, while the Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not find an explicit
legislative intent to create a legal entitlement to a default judgment, it also
did not find an explicit legislative intent to disallow such an entitlement.245
Nowhere in its opinion did the Pennsylvania Supreme Court enumerate the
legislative intent arguments put forth by the Court.246
The simple point is that, on its face, the Pennsylvania statute does not
create an exception that a defendant who receives a life sentence because of
a hung jury will not be legally entitled to that sentence at retrial.247 In fact,
no Pennsylvania statute makes a distinction between a life sentence which
is the product of a hung jury and a life sentence which is the product of a
unanimous jury verdict.248 The plain language of the statute, in addition to
243 Id. at 110.
244 Id.
245 See Commonwealth v. Sattazahn, 763 A.2d 359 (Pa. 2000).
246 Id.
247 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 971 1(c) (West 2004).
248 "Pennsylvania makes no statutory distinction between the treatment of life sentences
imposed by judicially directed verdicts and those imposed by unanimous juries in the event
the defendant successfully appeals his conviction." Petitioner's Brief at 14, Sattazahn (No.
01-7574).
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the lack of any other "statutory distinction," denotes that Sattazahn should
have had a legal entitlement to his original life sentence.249
Most importantly, the argument by the majority with respect to
possible legislative intent focuses only on a small portion of the State's
interest: its interest to prosecute defendants. However, this cannot be the
State's only interest in enacting a statute regulating capital sentencing
procedures. The State also has an interest of offering the utmost protection
to defendants when the defendant could possibly be sentenced to death.250
Indeed, in enacting such a statute, the State establishes its intention "that in
a capital sentencing proceeding, it is the State, not the defendant, that
should bear 'almost the entire risk of error.' ' '251 Pennsylvania's legislative
intent in providing protection to the defendant reveals itself in the language
of the statute: while the prosecution must prove aggravating circumstances
beyond a reasonable doubt, the defense must prove mitigating
circumstances only by a preponderance of the evidence.252 Additionally,
the statute allows the death penalty only in the situation where the jury
unanimously votes for such a sentence.25  In all other cases, including
when the jury is hung, the statute mandates life imprisonment.2 5 4 Apparent
in the language of the statute is "a presumption of life" 255 for the defendant
during the capital sentencing proceedings.
Moreover, there is "eminently good cause" 256 to find a legislative
intent to presume that a defendant is entitled to a life sentence. As the
dissent points out, "death is indeed a penalty 'different' from all others;,
257
a capital sentence is "unique 'in both its severity and finality . ,,,258 The
State has an interest to apply such a severe sentence sparingly, and only in
situations of clear guilt. The interest of the defendant requires the State to
protect her interest in not erroneously receiving the death penalty. In this
case, that is exactly what occurred; the jury was deadlocked nine-to-three in
favor of life imprisonment. 259 As a result of the operation of Pennsylvania
249 Id.
250 See Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 445-46 (1981).
251 Id. at 446 (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 424 (1979)).
252 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 971 1(c).
253 Id.
254 Id.
255 Commonwealth v. Travaglia, 467 A.2d 288, 300 (Pa. 1983).
256 Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 110 (2003).
257 Id. at 127 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188
(1976)).
258 Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721, 732 (1998) (quoting Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S.
349, 358 (1977)).
259 Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 104.
20041
SUPREME COURTREVIEW
260law, such an outcome meant that Sattazahn was entitled to a life sentence.
The Pennsylvania legislature intended that in situations where the jury is
not unanimous in its decision between life imprisonment and the death
penalty, the defendant would receive a life sentence because of the injustice
of imposing a death sentence on such questionable grounds. The
Pennsylvania legislature thus intended Sattazahn to be legally entitled not to
receive the death penalty, and thus maintain legal entitlement in his life
sentence.
One could argue that "legal entitlement" to a life sentence in the
context of a capital sentencing proceeding should be governed foremost by
prior Supreme Court cases that dealt with double jeopardy protection of
prior sentences and only secondarily by state law. For instance, one could
argue that Stroud and Pearce created a type of general "negative legal
entitlement." In other words, the Supreme Court's decision created an
overarching rule that a defendant is not entitled to a previous sentence at
retrial. Then, through its subsequent decisions in Bullington and Rumsey,
the Court "carved out" exceptions to this rule and created legal entitlements
only in the specific instances of unanimous jury acquittal and judgment
based on factual findings. The Court then disposed of the cases in Poland
and Monge simply because they did not fit into the aforementioned "carved
out" exceptions. Likewise, because Sattazahn did not fall into either of the
delineated niches, it too was a case of no "legal entitlement."
However, there are two flaws in the use of Supreme Court
jurisprudence to create paramount legal entitlements. First, it is a well-
settled principle that the states are reserved the police power, and included
in this power is the ability to sentence criminals in a manner which is bound
only by the Constitution.26' Second, if the Pennsylvania legislature decided
to enact legislation which stated that a defendant who receives a life
sentence at the initial trial cannot be sentenced to death at retrial, then such
legislation appears to pass constitutional muster because it does not violate
the Double Jeopardy Clause. Such a state statute-based legal entitlement
would be immune to Constitutional attack because it only provides
entitlement as opposed to unconstitutionally denying entitlement. In any
case, when the plain language of a state statute creates a legal entitlement to
a life sentence in the case of a hung jury at the capital sentencing
proceeding, no reason exists why this entitlement should be precluded by
Supreme Court cases which determine only the outer boundaries of state
action.
260 Id. at 105.
261 See generally United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
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The Supreme Court incorrectly held that David Sattazahn did not have
a legal entitlement to the life sentence issued at his first trial. By ending its
inquiry at whether Sattazahn received his sentence either through a
unanimous verdict or through a judgment based on factual findings, the
Court largely ignored reasons why a judgment based on an operation of law
should create a legal entitlement, including the clear mandate and intent of
the State to create such an entitlement. The Supreme Court should have
held that in a situation where the State created a legal entitlement to a life
sentence through an operation of law, such an entitlement precludes a
capital sentence at retrial.
B. THE PROCEDURAL METHOD THE TRIAL COURT USED TO INSTITUTE
A LIFE SENTENCE AFTER A HUNG JURY SHOWS JEOPARDY HAD
TERMINATED WITH RESPECT TO THE CAPITAL SENTENCE.
Jeopardy of the death penalty should have terminated at the occurrence
of either one of two events during the capital sentencing hearing: when the
jury could not unanimously decide on the punishment, or when the judge
discharged the jury and entered the life sentence.262 Even if the defendant
was not acquitted in the traditional sense, he should have been afforded
double jeopardy protection because his sentence was the result of a hung
jury and an operation of the court.
Traditionally, the Double Jeopardy Clause has stood in part for the
protection "against a second prosecution for the same offense after
acquittal. 263  The question then becomes whether double jeopardy
protection attaches to situations where the defendant is not acquitted, but
nonetheless the procedures are terminated with no conviction. The dissent
points to two situations where this could occur: mistrials and terminations
favorable to the defendant.264
Contrary to the majority's belief, the substance of double jeopardy
protection outside of a pure acquittal is not "a thin reed;, 265 rather, the
Court has repeatedly stated that double jeopardy protection could occur
when judgment is not based on factual guilt or innocence. In its 1957
decision of Green v. United States,266 the Supreme Court wrote: "it is not
even essential that a verdict of guilt or innocence be returned for a
defendant to have once been placed in jeopardy so as to bar a second trial
262 Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 104-05.
263 North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969).
264 Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 120 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Scott,
437 U.S. 82, 92 (1978)).
265 Id. at 113.
266 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
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on the same charge. 267  This quote embodies the idea that a judgment
based on factual guilt or innocence is not necessary for double jeopardy
protection. In two other situations, mistrials and terminations by the trial
judge, double jeopardy protection can attach to the outcome. In this case,
both situations occurred.
1. Because No Manifest Necessity Existed When the Jury Was Hung at the
Capital Sentencing Proceeding, Double Jeopardy Protection Should Have
Attached to Sattazahn's Life Sentence
The manifest necessity for a mistrial created by a hung jury in the trial
context is not created by a hung jury in the context of the capital sentencing
procedure at issue. As a result, the "mistrial 2 68 which occurred when the
jury could not decide on Sattazahn's punishment should have terminated
jeopardy of the death penalty.
When specific conditions are met, a declaration of mistrial by the
judge can be a situation where double jeopardy protection attaches.
"[M]istrials declared on the motion of the prosecution or sua sponte by the
court terminate jeopardy unless stopping the proceedings is required by
'manifest necessity.' '2 69  However, when the judge declares a mistrial
because of a hung jury, jeopardy does not terminate because a hung jury
creates a "manifest necessity" to end the trial.270  The Court gave two
reasons why a hung jury met the "manifest necessity" standard. First, the
prosecution should be given one complete opportunity to try the
defendant.27' Second, and of greater importance, the Court recognized that
if a hung jury resulted in a mistrial, and that mistrial afforded double
jeopardy protection to the defendant, the trial judge would have an incentive
267 Id. at 188. The Court gave the example where the prosecution or the judge discharges
the jury when it appears that the jury might not convict. Id.; see generally Burks v. United
States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978); United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564 (1977).
268 The term "mistrial" is used somewhat loosely in this section; its definition is: "[a] trial
that ends inconclusively because the jury cannot agree on a verdict." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY, supra note 18, at 1018. Obviously, the trial did not end inconclusively because
Sattazahn received a life sentence. However, the term can be used as a proxy to describe the
situation where a hung jury occurs and, but for the operation of Pennsylvania law, no
conclusion would have occurred. In other words, the discharge of the jury and the entrance
of a life sentence in the capital sentencing phase are analogous to a mistrial in the trial phase.
269 Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 121 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Scott, 437 U.S. at 93-94).
270 Id. at 121 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497,
509 (1978)).
271 Washington, 434 U.S. at 509.
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to "employ coercive means" in order to make the jury return a verdict.272
"Such a rule would frustrate the public interest in just judgments. 273
However, the Court's analysis necessarily leads to the conclusion that
while a hung jury may create a "manifest necessity" of a mistrial in the trial
context, it is not so in the context of a capital sentencing proceeding. The
first reason the Court gave is the assurance that the prosecution would
receive a complete opportunity to convict offenders of the law.274 In the
trial context, when a hung jury occurs and a mistrial is declared, the
defendant walks away from the trial without punishment. 75 In this sense,
the prosecution should be afforded the opportunity to "complete"
prosecution through retrial and determination of guilt or innocence;
otherwise, to allow defendants to go unpunished because of a jury's
inability to reach a unanimous decision would go "against the public
interest in insuring that justice is meted out to offenders. 27 6
In contrast, in the context of a capital sentencing proceeding, the
defendant does not walk away unpunished; under the Pennsylvania
sentencing scheme, the minimum sentence is life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole.277 Essentially, the public interest in punishing
offenders of the law has been met. Moreover, the Pennsylvania legislature
has already determined that one capital sentencing proceeding is a
"complete opportunity" for the prosecution to prove its case: in the situation
of a hung jury, the Pennsylvania statute mandates a sentence of life
imprisonment. 278 If the Pennsylvania legislature believed the single capital
sentencing hearing was not a "complete opportunity," it could have
provided for alternatives to judgment after a hung jury.279 The structure of
the statute is such that the legislature gives the prosecution a single chance
to convince the jury to unanimously decide on the sentence of death. While
this opportunity is limited, it is nonetheless complete.
Furthermore, the risk that a judge would not discharge the jury for the
express purpose of extracting a verdict is much lower in the context of a
capital sentencing proceeding. At the trial level, if defendants were
272 Id. at 509-10.
273 Id. at 510.
274 Id. at 509.
275 By definition, when a mistrial occurs, the defendant goes free. When a trial ends
without adjudication of guilt or innocence, the defendant does not receive any form of
punishment. See supra note 268.
276 United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 92 (1978).
277 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(c) (West 2004).
278 Id.




afforded double jeopardy protection through mistrials as a result of hung
juries, the trial judge would have a major choice: not discharge the jury
with the hope that time will allow the jury to make a unanimous decision of
guilt or innocence; or discharge the jury and allow the defendant to go
forever free. If the judge leaned towards the latter, then a probability exists
that violators of the law would go forever unpunished, as some persons set
free because of the hung jury are in fact guilty. If the judge leaned towards
the former, the same probability is lower, as defendants are forced to meet a
jury verdict, whether accurate or not. The judge thus has an incentive to not
discharge at the trial level.
2 80
On the other hand, the judge does not have such an incentive at the
capital sentencing phase. The defendant will meet a severe form of
punishment, either life imprisonment or death. 281 The judge thus has a very
different binary choice: at the trial level, the judge chooses between no
punishment and the possibility of punishment, while at the capital
sentencing level, the judge chooses between life imprisonment and the
possibility of the death penalty. The relatively smaller gap between the two
choices at the capital sentencing level means that the judge has much less of
an incentive to refuse to discharge a jury so that she can unfairly extract a
death sentence. In other words, no significant risk exists that the judge
would exert pressure on a hung jury to reach a potentially erroneous verdict.
One could argue that the Pennsylvania legislature's mandate of a life
sentence in the situation of a hung jury demonstrates the legislature's belief
that such a situation creates a manifest necessity to end the trial. Perhaps
the legislature felt that because of the severity of a death sentence, the risk
was still too great to allow a judge to exert pressure on the jury in a hung
jury context.282  However, two flaws exist in this argument. First, a
legislative decree of manifest necessity is not dispositive nor is it above
review. For instance, if the legislature were to enact a statute which stated
the trial judge could declare a mistrial when the jury might not convict,
predicating such a mistrial on the manifest necessity of convicting
criminals, no doubt exists that such purported manifest necessity would not
pass muster.
283
Moreover, the majority's arguments hypothesizing legislative intent
would be at odds with such an interpretation of manifest necessity. The
majority argued that the discharge of the jury and the entrance of the life
sentence (an act at the capital sentencing phase analogous to the act of
280 Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 509-10 (1978).
281 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711 (c).
282 See supra Part VI.A.2.
283 See supra note 267.
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declaration of mistrial at the trial phase) were the result of the "State's
simple interest in closure" and "its interest in conservation of resources."
2 84
If the majority was correct in guessing the legislative intent of the statute,
then the "mistrial" in this case was not the result of manifest necessity at all.
In the spectrum of manifest necessity, the interests of closure and
conservation of resources are quite a distance from the interest of protecting
society from erroneous jury decisions. While a great necessity may exist to
end a trial before adjudication in the situation where continuing the trial
may lead to an erroneous judgment, such a manifest necessity does not exist
when the State wants some sort of ending and wants to save money. Such a
situation is much more akin to the situation where the judge declares a
mistrial because the jury may not convict the defendant.285
At the trial level, if the judge could declare a mistrial because the state
wanted closure on the issue and the trial costs were burgeoning, no doubt
exists that double jeopardy protection would prevent the prosecution from
seeking another trial. 86 Assuming the legislative intent conjectured by the
majority to be true, no manifest necessity existed to end the capital
sentencing proceeding in this case. Because there was no manifest
necessity to end the "trial," and because the "trial" did in fact end,
Sattazahn was entitled to double jeopardy protection over the end result, his
life sentence.
No manifest necessity existed to end the capital sentencing proceeding.
The traditional rationales of allowing the prosecution a complete
opportunity and the risk of erroneous judgment were not present in this
case. Moreover, the legislative intent given by the majority demonstrated
that manifest necessity was not the impetus behind the discharge of the jury
and the institution of the life sentence. In any case, the "mistrial" that
occurred created double jeopardy protection for the life sentence.
2. Jeopardy of the Death Penalty Terminated in This Case Because the
Prosecution Received One Full Chance of "Convicting" Satttazahn of the
Death Penalty, and the Court on Its Own Volition Discharged the Jury and
Entered the Life Sentence
As the dissent pointed out, the Supreme Court's decision in Scott
287
leads to the conclusion that when the judge terminates the trial in favor of
the defendant, and when this termination occurs after the prosecution is
284 Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 110 (2003).
285 See Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 188 (1957).
286 id.
287 United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 (1978).
2004]
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
given a complete opportunity to try the defendant, the result of the
termination is protected by the Double Jeopardy Clause. 288 In this case, the
judge terminated the capital sentencing proceeding after the prosecution had
submitted its case to the jury. Accordingly, the result of the termination,
the life sentence, should have received double jeopardy protection.
In order to understand the application of Scott to this case, one should
examine the basic facts and analysis in that case. In Scott, the defendant
was charged with three counts of narcotics distribution. 28' At trial, the
defendant moved for dismissal of two of the counts because of prejudice
through preindictment delay.290 The court granted the motion.291 The third
count was submitted to the jury, and the jury returned a verdict of not
guilty.
292
The prosecution sought to appeal the dismissal of the two counts, and
the defendant claimed that the result of the motion was protected by the
Double Jeopardy Clause.29 3 The Supreme Court disagreed and held that
"[w]here the defendant himself seeks to have the trial determined without
any submission to either judge or jury as to his guilt or innocence, an appeal
by the Government from his successful effort to do so is not barred. ' 294 The
Court's decision rested on two grounds: first, the defendant was the cause
of the termination, and the prosecution as a result did not receive a full
opportunity to try the defendant; 295 and second, the judge and jury were
denied the opportunity to make adjudication on factual grounds.296 Through
examination of these factors, one can see that Sattazahn's life sentence
should have received double jeopardy protection.
The trial judge, not the defendant, decided to discharge the jury and
enter a life sentence.297 As a result, the defendant in this case cannot be
deemed as one who sought to avoid prosecution. In Scott, the Court
reasoned that the defendant could not claim double jeopardy protection
when his own action caused the premature termination of the trial.
However, in this case, the termination was not the result of the defendant's
298
actions. In fact, the legislature mandated the judge to dismiss the hung
288 Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 120 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Scott, 437 U.S. at 92).





294 Id. at 101.
295 Id. at 100.
296 id.
297 Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 104-05 (2003).
298 Id.
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jury and enter the life sentence. 299 Sattazahn did not try to avoid the death
penalty through a legal claim unrelated to factual guilt or innocence;
instead, the trial court was the force that ended the capital sentencing
proceedings.
300
The rationale behind the Court's argument in Scott was when a
defendant is the cause of the premature termination, the defendant
necessarily divests the prosecution of its right to a complete trial.30 1 In
Scott, the prosecution had been deprived of "one complete opportunity to
convict those who have violated its laws. 30 2 The defendant's motion to
dismiss in that case disallowed the prosecution from submitting its
complete case. 30 3  However, in the case at hand, no such divestment
occurred. The prosecution presented its case in entirety and submitted the
case to the jury.30 4 As the dissent correctly points out, "[t]his was not an
instance in which 'the Government was quite willing to continue with its
production of evidence,' but was thwarted by a defense-proffered
motion. Quite the contrary, after the prosecution submitted the case to
the jury, it could do absolutely nothing else: either the jury reached a
unanimous verdict, or it did not and the defendant received a life
sentence.30 6 In both situations, the prosecution could not make any
additional efforts; its opportunity was "complete."
Furthermore, the jury was allowed the opportunity to consider
Sattazahn's case, a fact which weighed in favor of double jeopardy
protection. In Scott, the Court made explicit reference to the importance of
allowing the jury to consider the case: "submission to either judge or jury
as to [the defendant's] guilt or innocence" was a crucial factor in
determining whether double jeopardy protection applied.30 7 The rationale
behind this factor was that in the case where the defendant purposely sought
to preclude a jury-made determination, the government could not be
construed as "an all-powerful state relentlessly pursuing a defendant
299 Id.
300 Id. The majority took issue with the fact that Sattazahn initially moved for dismissal
of the hung jury and the entrance of the life sentence. Id. at 114. However, the trial court
denied the motion because under Pennsylvania law it was required to determine whether
further deliberation could result in a unanimous verdict. Id. at 104-05. The trial court alone
had the power to discharge the jury, and it did so. Id.
30 Scott, 437 U.S. at 100.
302 Id. (quoting Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 509 (1978)).
303 Id. at 84.
" Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 104.
305 Id. at 124 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Scott, 437 U.S. at 96).
306 See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711 (c) (West 2004).
307 Scott, 437 U.S. at 101.
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who ... had at least insisted on having the issue of guilt submitted to the
trier of fact. 30 8
In this case, Sattazahn did not try to avoid the jury; in fact, the jury did
consider his case, but it was unable to reach a unanimous verdict. This is a
clear example where the defendant was "forced to run the gauntlet once...
and the jury refused to convict him."309 The case was before the jury and
the defendant was in peril of punishment of death, and this peril ended with
the entrance of a mandated life sentence. 310 This is not the same situation as
Scott, where the defendant removed himself from such peril before the jury
could decide his case.31'
Indeed, the government in this case could be characterized as the "all-
powerful state" wearing down the defendant.31 2 The prosecution's evidence
used to convict Sattazahn of the death penalty was found after the first
trial; 313 the evidence available to the prosecution during the first trial was
not enough to convince the jury beyond a reasonable doubt that Sattazahn
deserved the death penalty. 31 4 This bolsters the fact that the government,
with its extensive resources, continued to collect evidence to convict
Sattazahn of the death penalty, even after the entrance of the life sentence.
One could argue that Scott only stood for the proposition that a
defendant who prematurely terminates a trial without adjudication of factual
innocence or guilt is not entitled to double jeopardy protection to the
resulting dismissal of the charge. In this sense, the Court did not answer
whether a defendant who does not prematurely terminate the trial is entitled
to protection. However, as the dissent points out, "the reasons we thought
double jeopardy protection did not attach in Scott are absent here." 315
Because the Scott decision did not foreclose the possibility that Sattazahn
would receive double jeopardy protection, the Court should have used this
case to elucidate double jeopardy protection in the situation where the trial
court, not the defendant, ends the "trial." Granted, the fact that Sattazahn's
case fell outside the scope of the holding in Scott does not necessarily mean
that double jeopardy protection attached; rather the fact that this case was
outside the holding of Scott afforded the Court the opportunity to clarify its
double jeopardy jurisprudence, an opportunity which the Court did not take.
308 Id. at 96.
309 Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 190 (1957).
310 Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 104-05.
311 Scott, 437 U.S. at 84.
311 Id. at 96.
313 Respondent's Brief at 6, Sattazahn (No. 0 1-7574).
314 Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 104.
315 Id. at 126 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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The jeopardy of the death penalty terminated in this case. Sattazahn
did not voluntarily decide to end the capital sentencing proceeding; the trial
court terminated the proceeding. Moreover, the case was submitted to the
jury. Sattazahn did not impede the adjudication process in anyway, and the
prosecution was able to present its full case. As a result, double jeopardy
protection should have attached to the defendant's original life sentence.
VII. CONCLUSION
In its decision to focus solely on whether Sattazahn was "acquitted" of
the death penalty, the Supreme Court lost sight of its prior double jeopardy
jurisprudence, the plain command of the Pennsylvania legislature, and its
decisions in the situations of mistrials and terminations favorable to the
defendant. The Court's focus on the word "acquittal" as the exclusive
means of legal entitlement was a classic example of "the substitution of
words for analysis." 316  Instead of carefully examining a "genuinely
debatable" question,317 the Court made the conclusory determination that
any case outside of an "acquittal" would not receive double jeopardy
protection.
Moreover, had the Court examined the arguments on both sides, it
would have seen overwhelming case support for the defendant. When a
judge terminates a trial in favor of a defendant through a motion of the
court, and when the defendant does not seek to avoid adjudication but
submits his case to the jury, no reason exists why double jeopardy
protection should not apply.
Equally important, when a judge declares a "mistrial" and dismisses
the jury, and the "mistrial" is not the product of manifest necessity, the
defendant is entitled to double jeopardy protection of the result of the
mistrial. Assuming, as the majority does, the Pennsylvania legislature
created a life sentence in the case of a hung jury because of closure and
monetary interests, the end of David Sattazahn's first trial was not the result
of manifest necessity. Because the defendant is entitled to double jeopardy
protection when a "mistrial" is declared for reasons other than manifest
necessity, Sattazahn should not have been subject to the death penalty at
retrial.
David Chu
316 United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
317 Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 119 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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